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GTD

Cyclicals

Công ty Cổ phần Giầy Thượng Đình

Hàng cá nhân & Gia dụngHàng cá nhânCT
92.500
VND · Last close
Valuation Verdict
Overvalued
Very Low
-27.4%
-120%Fair Value+120%
Current
92.500
Intrinsic Value
67.142
ModelEV EBITDA MIDCYCLE

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Research Note

GTD: deeply distressed footwear maker; market price reflects significant downside and forensic concerns

Intrinsic value VND 92,910 vs market price VND 128,000, implying -27.4% downside (valuation confidence: very_low).

Business Overview

Công ty Cổ phần Giầy Thượng Đình (GTD) is a UPCOM-listed manufacturer in the personal goods / footwear segment (ICB: Hàng cá nhân). The company is small-cap with 9,300,000 shares outstanding and operates in a highly cyclical consumer segment. Reported revenue has declined from VND 80.2 bn in 2023 to VND 66.4 bn in 2025, reflecting weakening top-line momentum over the past three years.

Investment Thesis

GTD is a financially distressed business: the model flags the company as "distressed" with a mid-cycle EBITDA that is negative and the valuation model (EV/EBITDA mid-cycle) produces an intrinsic value well below the current market price. Profitability metrics are deeply negative — net profit margin is -58.4% and EBIT margin is -51.6% — driven by shrinking revenue (VND 78.8 bn in 2024 to VND 66.4 bn in 2025) and escalating losses (net loss widened to VND -38.7 bn in 2025). Balance-sheet stress is visible: ROE is -5.6%, ROA is -0.4%, BVPS is negative at VND -1,335.96, and Debt/Equity shows a negative reading (indicative of negative equity). These factors support the view that current market pricing factors in significant distress and execution risk.

On the margin there are limited operational positives: gross margin is almost breakeven at 0.6% and DSRI suggests manageable inventory relative to sales, but cash conversion is very weak and earnings quality is middling (56.2/100). For investors, the valuation upside is negative (-27.4%) and model confidence is very_low, so any recovery thesis would require clear, tangible evidence of returning positive EBITDA, a credible restructuring plan, or balance-sheet repair. Given concentrated ownership (top five holders account for ~99.5%) and zero foreign room, liquidity and activist-driven outcomes are unlikely near term.

Valuation Commentary

EV/EBITDA mid-cycle model calibrated with isotonic regression and sanity checks to account for distress; intrinsic value derived from mid-cycle EBITDA and sector multiples.

  • Mid-cycle EBITDA flagged as negative (model flagged the company as distressed; calibration used because raw intrinsic came out zero).
  • Recent 3-year revenue trajectory: VND 80.2 bn (2023) → VND 78.8 bn (2024) → VND 66.4 bn (2025).
  • Severe negative margins: EBIT margin -51.6% and net profit margin -58.4%, depressing earnings base for valuation.
  • Forensic/sanity flags in the model: low liquidity, manipulation risk, negative equity — these lowered model confidence to very_low.

The implied intrinsic value of VND 92,910 (vs market VND 128,000) indicates the market currently trades above the model's distressed valuation, producing a -27.4% implied downside. Confidence in the valuation is very_low due to negative EBITDA, negative equity and multiple sanity flags; therefore the point estimate should be treated cautiously and viewed as an indication of distress rather than a precise liquidation or recovery value.

Bull vs Bear

Bull Case
  • Operational turnaround: if revenue stabilises and the company returns to positive EBITDA, the mid-cycle EV/EBITDA could re-rate from distressed levels, supporting a recovery from the current intrinsic shortfall.
  • Inventory control evidence: DSRI of 0.43 suggests effective inventory management which could aid margin rescue if demand recovers.
  • Concentrated institutional ownership (three institutions each ~24%) could enable a coordinated restructuring or capital support if strategic priorities align.
Bear Case
  • Deep and widening losses: net loss increased to VND -38.7 bn in 2025 from VND -13.0 bn in 2024, with net profit margin -58.4% and EBIT margin -51.6%, indicating weak operational viability.
  • Forensic red flags: Beneish M-Score of -1.1709 (in the 86th percentile vs peers) and a year-over-year M-Score deterioration of +1.65 point to aggressive accounting risk.
  • Balance-sheet and liquidity stress: Altman Z-Score of 1.99 places the company in a grey zone for bankruptcy risk; model sanity flags include low liquidity and negative equity.
  • Zero foreign_room and very low trading liquidity (avg volume 40 shares over 2 weeks) limit potential buyer breadth and make a market re-rating unlikely without material fundamentals improvement.

Sector Context

GTD sits in the cyclical personal-goods sector where demand is sensitive to consumer spending and macro cycles. The peer set shows a wide dispersion: sector median implied upside is +5.6%, while the top disposable peers report double-digit upside. GTD's position in the sector is at the distressed tail — several peers have healthy recoveries while smaller UPCOM names can remain depressed for extended periods. Vietnamese accounting under VAS (timing of recognition, provisions) and the prevalence of state-related shareholders (one top holder is a large SOE) add complexity to forensic assessments. Regulatory factors relevant to financing include limited foreign ownership room (GTD foreign_room = 0.0) which reduces potential foreign liquidity, and state/strategic shareholders that may be obliged to hold or support positions rather than crystallise losses quickly.

Risk Factors

  • Aggressive accounting/manipulation risk: Beneish M-Score -1.1709 (> -1.78 threshold) and a YoY M-Score deterioration of +1.65 raise the possibility of earnings management.
  • Bankruptcy/capital risk: Altman Z-Score of 1.99 sits in a caution zone; negative equity and negative BVPS (VND -1,335.96) increase solvency risk.
  • Cash-flow shortfall: earnings quality score 56.2 with cash conversion at 2.0/100 implies reported profits are not well backed by cash.
  • Liquidity and marketability: very low trading liquidity (avg volume 40 shares/2w) and no foreign room (0.0%) impair tradability and the ability to exit positions.
  • Concentrated ownership: top five holders hold ~99.5%, which can limit free-float and slows market-driven corporate actions.
  • Model and valuation uncertainty: valuation confidence is very_low due to negative EBITDA and multiple sanity flags; intrinsic estimate should be used cautiously.

Catalysts

  • Clear operational turnaround with sequential improvements in EBITDA and margins.
  • Restructuring announcement or capital injection by major institutional shareholders (three holders each ~24%).
  • Audit disclosure or management communication that addresses Beneish M-Score/forensic concerns and improves transparency.
  • Any strategic sale or merger that addresses negative equity and restores investor confidence.

Forensic Assessment

Forensic indicators are a primary concern. Beneish M-Score is -1.1709 (above the -1.78 manipulation threshold and in the 86th percentile versus peers), with a YoY worsening of +1.65, which suggests increased incentive or evidence of aggressive accounting. The Altman Z-Score of 1.99 places GTD in a grey zone for bankruptcy risk. Earnings quality is mediocre at 56.2/100 and cash conversion is alarmingly low (2.0/100), so reported losses may not be matched by cash improvements. Positive signals are limited: DSRI of 0.43 shows inventories are being managed relative to sales and accrual score is strong at 100/100 for receivables handling. Overall, forensic flags raise meaningful doubt over the sustainability and transparency of reported results; investors should demand higher transparency and cash-flow evidence before assuming recovery.

Track Record

The model track record spans 10 years with a hit rate of 55.6%, meaning slightly better than a coin flip in directional calls historically. However the average realised outcome across the model's history is poor (avg_upside_pct -63.198%), reflecting that when the model flags distress it has often been prescient in predicting downside. Given the current valuation confidence is very_low, past performance provides limited comfort and the negative average outcome advises caution when extrapolating the model's point estimate.

Written by a language model on 2026-08-10 from this page’s own model outputs and financial statements, and may quote figures from that date. Descriptive analysis, not investment advice — no buy, sell or hold recommendation is given or implied.

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Financial Forensics

Beneish M-Score · 2025

Moderate
M -1.17 · 86th pctile vs peers
YoY ▲ +1.65
Conservative vs VN peersAggressive
Compare across the whole market

Ranked vs Vietnamese peers. The −1.78 Beneish cutoff is US-calibrated; ~28% of VN stocks exceed it.

DSRI
0.430
GMI
10.000
AQI
1.012
SGI
0.843
DEPI
0.938
SGAI
2.009
TATA
-0.523
LVGI
1.478

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Key Ratios

Fiscal year 2025
-22.21P/E
P/B0.00
P/S12.96
ROE-557.9%
ROA-39.5%
EPS-4165.05
BVPS-1335.96
Gross Margin0.6%
Net Margin-58.3%
D/E-7.11
Current Ratio0.36
EV/EBITDA-29.23
Div Yield0.0%

Company Overview

Issued Shares
9.3M
Charter Capital
93.0B VND
Sector (ICB L2)
Hàng cá nhân & Gia dụng
Industry (ICB L3)
Hàng cá nhân
Sub-industry
Giầy dép
Company Type
CT

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Computed 28/08/2026
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