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VCE

Construction

Công ty Cổ phần Xây lắp Môi trường

Xây dựng và Vật liệuCT
8.000
VND · Last close
Valuation Verdict
Overvalued
Low
-11.6%
-120%Fair Value+120%
Current
8.000
Intrinsic Value
7.071
ModelEV EBITDA MIDCYCLE

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Research Note

VCE: Illiquid small-cap with weak earnings and forensic red flags; valuation implies downside

Intrinsic value VND 7,071 vs market VND 8,000 — implied downside -11.6% (model confidence: low).

Business Overview

Công ty Cổ phần Xây lắp Môi trường (VCE) is a small UPCOM-listed construction contractor operating in construction and materials (ICB: Xây dựng và Vật liệu). The company has 5.0m shares outstanding and reported very low revenues in recent years (VND 1.2 bn in 2023-24; VND 0.2 bn in 2025). Balance-sheet scale is small: reported total assets of VND 79.1 bn in 2023, VND 79.2 bn in 2024 and VND 77.9 bn in 2025. Major shareholders are concentrated: Công ty Cổ phần Tập đoàn CMH Việt Nam holds 68.438% and Tập đoàn Công nghiệp Than - Khoáng sản Việt Nam holds 30.0%, leaving minimal free float and limited trading liquidity (avg volume 2w = 0).

Investment Thesis

VCE’s intrinsic value from our EV/EBITDA mid-cycle model is VND 7,071 per share versus a market quote of VND 8,000, implying a -11.6% gap and limited upside. The valuation reflects a weak earnings base (mid_cycle_ebitda = 20530718; fair_ev_ebitda = 9.46) and net cash (net_debt = -237513563) embedded in the model inputs. Fundamental performance is poor: negative ROE (-1.8%), negative ROA (-1.31%), and negative net margin (-4.5391) with EPS deeply negative (EPS = -205.3228 VND). These operating losses and very low revenue scale (VND 0.2–1.2 bn range 2023–25) undermine prospects for a meaningful rerating.

Countervailing items are limited but material to note: reported P/B of 0.71 and net cash in the model (net_debt negative) provide some balance-sheet support versus peers. However, the stock is illiquid (1-year high/low both VND 8,000; avg volume 2w = 0) and foreign ownership room of 2,450,000 shares is available but effectively moot given concentrated insider ownership (>98% combined institutional stake). Execution and reporting risks are elevated: forensic flags (Beneish M-Score moves and low cash-conversion) make reported results less reliable and reduce confidence in any implied valuation upside.

Valuation Commentary

EV/EBITDA mid-cycle model: we apply a fair EV/EBITDA multiple to a mid-cycle EBITDA to derive enterprise value, adjust for net debt and divide by shares to get an intrinsic per-share value.

  • Mid-cycle EBITDA used: 20530718 (model input).
  • Fair EV/EBITDA multiple: 9.46 (own_history); sector median EV/EBITDA = 9.85.
  • Net debt in model: -237513563 (net cash), which lifts intrinsic value per share.
  • Calibration: isotonic calibration produced a raw intrinsic value of 86.36 before scaling to per-share terms; model confidence flagged as low after recalibration.

The model implies VND 7,071 per share, which is 11.6% below the current market price. Given the low model confidence and substantial forensic/sanity flags (illiquid, mediocre earnings quality, manipulation_risk), the downside should be interpreted conservatively: the numeric implied downside is meaningful but model reliability is low, so actual outcomes could diverge materially.

Bull vs Bear

Bull Case
  • Balance-sheet cushion: model reports net_debt = -237513563 (net cash), which supports intrinsic value despite operating losses.
  • Low P/B at 0.7093 provides a margin relative to book (BVPS = 11,278.4296 VND) if book value is preserved.
  • Large institutional owners (68.438% and 30.0%) could provide stability and the possibility of corporate actions or restructuring.
Bear Case
  • Forensic red flags: Beneish M-Score = -0.2502 with a 92nd percentile ranking and a year-over-year increase of +2.44 suggest aggressive accounting and heightened manipulation risk.
  • Very weak operating metrics: Net profit losses (VND -0.9 bn in 2023; VND -1.0 bn in 2025) and negative margins (net margin -4.5391, EBIT margin -4.433) point to structural profitability issues.
  • Illiquidity and concentrated ownership (combined institutional >98%) limit market exit options for minority holders; avg_volume_2w = 0.
  • Earnings-quality weaknesses: overall earnings quality score 34.3/100, with cash conversion 16.5/100 and receivables 0.0/100, implying potential liquidity and collectability problems.

Sector Context

The construction and materials sector in Vietnam is cyclical and sensitive to SBV credit conditions, public investment cycles and land-use/right issues for real-estate-linked contractors. EV/EBITDA multiples in the sector are around 9.85 (median), and our peer analysis shows many small caps with wide dispersion in implied upside. For state-connected or SOE-exposed names, there can be implicit support but also directives (payouts, related-party work) that distort earnings under VAS accounting. For small UPCOM names, illiquidity and opaque disclosures are common, increasing execution and forensic risk. VCE’s tiny revenue base, combined with concentrated state-related ownership (30.0% held by a large industrial group), increases the need to scrutinize related-party transactions and VAS-specific accounting treatments.

Risk Factors

  • Aggressive accounting/manipulation risk: Beneish M-Score = -0.2502 and large year-over-year deterioration (+2.44) — elevated risk of earnings manipulation.
  • Poor earnings quality and liquidity: earnings_quality = 34.3/100; cash-conversion = 16.5/100; receivables scoring 0.0/100 — receivables risk and weak cash cover.
  • Persistent losses and small scale: net profit negative in 2023 and 2025 (VND -0.9 bn and VND -1.0 bn) with minimal revenues (VND 0.2–1.2 bn), limiting operational resilience.
  • Illiquidity and concentrated ownership: avg_volume_2w = 0, top two institutions hold ~98.4% combined, reducing free float and tradability.
  • For UPCOM governance and disclosure gaps: UPCOM listings often have less stringent disclosure than HOSE/HNX, complicating forensic verification and minority protections.
  • Model confidence and data limitations: valuation confidence labeled low; seven years of data with high EBITDA CV (2.0165) raise forecasting error.
  • Event risk from major shareholders: with two institutions owning the vast majority, corporate actions (related-party contracts, capital changes) could materially affect minority holders without open-market signaling.

Catalysts

  • Publication of audited financials or cash-flow evidence that materially improves earnings-quality scores (cash conversion and receivables).
  • Corporate action by majority shareholders (divestment, restructuring, or a buyout) that changes free float or simplifies ownership.
  • Any evidence of revenue scaling or contract wins that reverse the recent revenue decline (from VND 1.2 bn to VND 0.2 bn).

Forensic Assessment

Forensic signals are the primary concern. Beneish M-Score at -0.2502 exceeds the -1.78 threshold for manipulation likelihood and sits in the 92nd percentile among peers, with a sharp year-over-year rise (+2.44), indicating increasing aggressive accounting. Earnings-quality = 34.3/100 is low, driven by very poor cash-conversion (16.5/100) and receivables (0.0/100), although accruals score is strong (100/100). Altman Z-Score of 2.05 places the company in a grey-zone for bankruptcy risk. Together these flags reduce confidence in reported profits and in the reliability of book equity, especially under VAS where measurement and related-party treatment can differ from IFRS peers.

Track Record

The forecasting track record for this model over nine years shows a hit rate of 37.5% (model correctly called direction per its >10% upside rule in 3.4 of 9 years), with an average realized upside of 14.0% in years it was successful. This is a mediocre historical performance (hit_rate = 0.375) and, combined with the current low model confidence and forensic red flags, suggests limited reliance on the model output without corroborating fundamental improvements.

Written by a language model on 2026-08-11 from this page’s own model outputs and financial statements, and may quote figures from that date. Descriptive analysis, not investment advice — no buy, sell or hold recommendation is given or implied.

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Financial Forensics

Beneish M-Score · 2025

High Risk
M -0.25 · 92th pctile vs peers
YoY ▲ +2.44
Conservative vs VN peersAggressive
Compare across the whole market

Ranked vs Vietnamese peers. The −1.78 Beneish cutoff is US-calibrated; ~28% of VN stocks exceed it.

DSRI
5.141
GMI
0.998
AQI
1.000
SGI
0.190
DEPI
1.000
SGAI
5.538
TATA
-0.016
LVGI
1.003

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Key Ratios

Fiscal year 2025
-38.96P/E
P/B0.71
P/S176.86
ROE-1.8%
ROA-1.3%
EPS-205.32
BVPS11278.43
Gross Margin100.0%
Net Margin-453.9%
D/E0.38
Current Ratio3.62
EV/EBITDA-39.66
Div Yield0.0%

Company Overview

Issued Shares
5.0M
Charter Capital
50.0B VND
Sector (ICB L2)
Xây dựng và Vật liệu
Industry (ICB L3)
Xây dựng và Vật liệu
Sub-industry
Xây dựng
Company Type
CT

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Computed 28/08/2026
Methodology & Disclosure

vnvalue is a methodology engine — not an advisor. Every number is the deterministic output of a published formula applied to public financial data. Nothing on this page constitutes investment, financial, legal, or tax advice, nor a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any security.

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